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Abstract  
Property in an elusive concept. In many respects it has been regarded as a source of 
authority to use, develop and make decisions about whatever is the subject matter of 
this right of ownership. This is true whether the holder of this right of ownership is a 
private entity or a public entity. Increasingly a right of ownership of this kind has been 
recognised not only as a source of authority but also as a mechanism for restricting 
or limiting and perhaps even prohibiting existing or proposed activities that impact 
upon the environment. It is increasingly therefore an instrument of regulation as 
much as an instrument of authorisation. The protection and conservation of the 
environment are ultimately a matter of the public interest. This is not to suggest that 
the individual holders of rights of ownership are not interested in protecting the 
environment. It is open to them to do so in the exercise of a right of ownership as a 
source of authorisation. However a right of ownership – whether private or public – 
has become increasingly the mechanism according to which the environment is 
protected and conserved through the use of rights of ownership as a means of 
regulation. This paper addressed these issues from a doctrinal as well as a practical 
perspective in how the environment is managed.  
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Introduction 
The elusiveness of property as a concept is reflected not only by the variety of 
meanings attributed to it by the dictionary but also by the complex range of functions 
it performs as a political, an economic, a social, a cultural, and even a legal 
institution.  A point of commencement is the meaning of the word. It may be, for 
example, the characteristic or quality of owning or of being owned or it may be the 
thing owned. The use of the word own is itself controversial. But it directs attention to 
the question who owns: whereas the word property directs attention to the question 
what is owned. These are static concepts. But more important is the question what 
can and what cannot be achieved in a practical sense as a result of the ownership of 
what is owned. This is a dynamic concept.  
Property as a concept within the legal system has been described in many ways 
over the years. For example:  
• A bundle of rights 
• A web of interests  
• A mosaic of relationships.1 
But what are these rights, interests and relationships? There is no simple answer to 
these questions.  It depends upon what is the object of ownership; who is the subject 
of ownership: and what is the outcome to be achieved by ownership. While property 
may encapsulate these elements of ownership as a concept, the instrumental value 
of property is realised only when these aspects of ownership are given effect in 
particular sets of circumstances. For example, in the context of environmental 
governance, what is appropriate-itself an adjective with etymological links to the 
noun property-is likely to depend upon three factors. The first is the object of 
ownership-the surface of land, the bed of a river, the water flowing in a river, the 
vegetation superjacent to the surface of land, the minerals subjacent to the surface 
of land, the water in subterranean aquifers, and the biota associated with all of these. 
The second is the subject of ownership-an individual person, a group of individual 
persons comprising a community, a corporate person, a public institution such as a 
local government or a department of central government. The third is the outcomes 
to be achieved as a result of ownership- outcomes determined by who is the subject 
of ownership (discretionary outcomes) or outcomes determined by the application of 
policies, processes and rules (regulated outcomes).  
What emerges from this scenario is a concept of property as a set of political, 
economic, social, cultural and legal arrangements – a property regime in other 
words. But what conditions need to be satisfied before a property regime can 
achieve its objectives. These objectives may be political, economic, social, cultural or 
legal. But from a legal perspective the critical question is the extent to which these 
objectives are prescribed by law or whether they are a matter for the exercise of a 
discretion on the part of the subject of these arrangements. The answer to this 
question, it is suggested, is a normative structure that comprises rules of 
competence and rules of limitation. The former state who is enabled to undertake 
activities and to make decisions about activities. The latter state what activities may 
be undertaken and what decisions may be made but also how these activities may 
                                                          
1 See generally D. Grinlinton and P. Taylor (eds), Property Rights and Sustainability (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, 2011) 
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be undertaken and how these decisions are made. It is these two sets of rules 
operating together that state the conditions to be satisfied before a property regime 
can achieve its objectives.  
These rules of competence and these rules of limitation assume different 
forms and perform different functions within the legal system. In the context of 
environmental governance generally, it has been suggested that there are six 
elements of such a structure. These are:  
• A framework of normative values 
• Competence rules 
• Strategic rules 
• Regulatory rules 
• Liability rules 
• Market rules. 2 
Arguably a property regime fits within this structure. Property in its widest sense may 
be seen to be a normative value by itself. Property may be seen to be a competence 
rule in a sense that the owner is entitled-has the competence – to engage in a 
particular activity. Strategic rules are similarly part of a property regime to the extent 
that strategic rules-not necessarily directly enforceable as a matter of law by 
themselves-indicate broadly the direction of decision making and consequently what 
objectives are to be achieved. Regulatory rules are much more specific and are 
capable of enforcement to the extent that they prescribe how activities are to be 
undertaken, how decisions are to be made, what activities may not be undertaken 
and what decisions may not be made. Liability rules are the means according to 
which the other sets of rules are capable of being enforced through the legal system. 
Market rules-a phenomenon increasingly significant in the context of environmental 
governance – are the rules that create or recognise objects of ownership capable of 
being traded in a market and the rules according to which such a market operates. In 
this way property as a concept has practical reality only in the context of a property 
regime that contains structural elements such as these. In practice these structural 
elements comprise the conditions to be satisfied before a property regime can 
achieve its objectives. Is this analysis realistic or fantastic? Property in its historical 
context. 
Property in its historical perspective 3 
(a) Roman law 
The variety of functions performed by a property regime may be analysed 
historically first in the context of Roman law and second in the context of the 
common law within a framework of feudalism. Roman law classified the ownership of 
things- res – in a number of different ways. Some by virtue of their nature were 
incapable of belonging to individual persons, while some belonged to nobody. In the 
case of the latter, for example wild animals, ownership was created by taking the 
thing into physical possession. For present purposes the four most important 
classifications are these:  
                                                          
2 See generally D. E. Fisher, Australian Environmental Law Norms, Principles and Rules (Thomson Reuters, 
Sydney, 2010) pp 9 to 11 
3 See generally D. E. Fisher, Natural Resources Law in Australia (Lawbook Company, Sydney, 1987) pp50 to 52 
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• Res propriae  
• Res alienae  
• Res publicae 
• Res communes. 
The first category comprises things that belong to a clearly identifiable person. That 
is the person who is the subject of ownership. The second describes things that 
belong to someone else – that is a different subject of ownership. The third describes 
things that belong to the public at large through the agency of the state. The fourth 
describes what may now be regarded as common property. In this case a member of 
the group comprising the community has a right of access to and the use of these 
objects of common ownership. According to Justinian there were four such res 
communes and acknowledged as such by ius naturale. There were: 
• Aer – the air 
• Aqua profluens – running water 
• Mare- the sea 
• Per hoc littora maris – the seashore 
All of these were part of a property regime supported by what we have described as 
rules of competence. 
It was the category of res propriae that provided the legal impetus for the 
emergence hundreds of years later of a property regime which focussed upon the 
interests of the individual and which became in the 18th and 19th centuries a capitalist 
economy based upon trade and commerce. The importance of the legal recognition 
of res propriae lay in its recognition of two of the three essential foundational 
elements of a property regime: namely, who is the subject of ownership and what is 
the object of ownership. In other words, in very specific and clearly identifiable terms, 
who owns what? This does not address what has become one of the most important 
questions in relation to a property regime: namely, what objectives are to be 
achieved by it. On the face of, it any objects of ownership-res or things- could be res 
propriae. What has become particularly important in the context of legal 
developments has been land as res propriae. Particularly critical in this respect has 
been the introduction of the feudal system and its eventual collapse.  
(b) English Law  
Let us turn our attention now from Roman law to English law. Roman law was 
based upon the concept of dominium – a concept of autonomous and indivisible 
ownership. The introduction into English law of the feudal system carried with it the 
notion of tenure. Tenure involves recognition of a series of hierarchically related 
interests in the land. Under the feudal system a vassal held land of a superior and a 
superior could hold land of another superior. Ultimately the superior in relation to all 
land was the Crown. The introduction of the concept of tenure involved splitting 
dominium into two concepts: the dominium directum and the dominium utile. 
Accordingly a range of different persons might have a set of different interests in the 
same area of land. Ownership was thus divided into two or more fragmented 
interests. The holder of the dominium directum was the beneficiary of obligations 
imposed upon the vassal: for example, military service or agricultural services later 
converted to financial obligations. The holder of a dominium utile had the benefit of 
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the use of the land but in accordance with and on condition of compliance with the 
obligations imposed by the superior. The fragmentation of ownership by the feudal 
system enabled the creation of a series of interests in one area of land in ways in 
which these interests might be in conflict. Since the ultimate superior of all land was 
the Crown, this gave to the Crown a privileged position within the property regime 
created by the feudal system. It enabled the Crown to make decisions in its own 
interests or in the interests of the community at large. Significantly this is a feature 
that perhaps may be evolving once again in the legal arrangements of the 21st 
century.  
Significantly the feudal system in England had effect side by side with the 
common law. Some of the rules of the common law reflected aspects of pre-feudal 
Anglo-Saxon law: namely rights of common in land. It has been summarised that “a 
right of common is a right exercisable by one or more persons to take or use 
elements of natural resources that technically belong to someone else.” For 
example, the commons of pasture, piscary, turbary or estovers. These rights of 
access were available only to members of the relevant group or community. A right 
of common was not associated with the ownership of res communes. It may however 
be seen to be part of a property regime. Consider an example. The common of 
turbary was the right of a commoner to take peat or turf from waste lands belonging 
to someone else as a domestic fuel. The waste lands were an object of ownership 
and consequently the peat or turf in question was an object of ownership but the 
subject of ownership changed when the member of the privileged group or 
community – the commoner – took advantage of it by removing the peat or turf. Thus 
the land subject to these common law rules about rights of common could be used 
for the benefit of two or more different categories of person. What is particularly 
important is that the recognition of tenure by the feudal system and the recognition of 
rights of common by the common law system ensured a variety of legal interests in 
the same area of land held by different persons and groups of persons. Even more 
important, neither under the feudal system nor under the common law system did 
any person have an absolute or unqualified interest in the object of ownership-mostly 
land.  
(c) Conclusion  
But all this changed when the feudal system started to disintegrate, when the 
enclosure movement began in earnest, when trade and commerce became the main 
features of the economy and when the philosophical and economic foundations of a 
capitalistic economy were established in the 18th century. These foundations were a 
property regime based almost exclusively on rights of private ownership or, to 
transpose it into Roman law terms, rights of dominium in respect of res propriae. 
Indeed as Blackstone commented in relation to life, liberty and property as the basic 
rights of individuals:  
The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: 
which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, 
without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land. 4 
Although Blackstone described it as an absolute right, he was speaking in cultural 
rather than legal terms because even Blackstone realised that the laws of the land 
                                                          
4 See Grinlinton and Taylor (eds), note 1, p277 
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could interfere with this right. And so it has transpired. The laws of the land now 
protect not only the interests of other citizens, be they subjects of ownership or not, 
but also the wider interests that the community has in how its natural resources are 
developed and its environment protected. Let us now move directly into the 21st 
century.  
Property as a human right  
(a) Introduction 
 The dominance of individual rights of ownership in property regimes continued 
during the 19th and 20th centuries. It has however begun to be challenged in a 
number of the capitalist economies around the world. Increasingly the objectives of a 
property regime have included, first, resource conservation or sustainable 
development and, second, environmental protection. However at the same time 
individual rights of ownership have emerged internationally and nationally in many 
jurisdictions as a human right worthy of recognition and protection. An emerging 
challenge is thus how to accommodate within a property regime the potential 
tensions and conflicts that may arise between the public and the private interests in 
how regimes for environmental governance are created and implemented.  
(b) The approach in international instruments 5 
Let us consider examples of international declarations about property as a human 
right. The earliest is article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. It 
states:  
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others.  
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.  
This declares that it is a privilege to be the subject of ownership.  Property can mean 
only the object of ownership. The subject of ownership can be deprived of the 
relevant object of ownership but legally and not arbitrarily. Consequently, while the 
right to ownership is important, it is not absolute.  Article 15 of the Cairo Declaration 
of Human Rights in Islam 1990 goes somewhat further. Everyone has the right to 
own property acquired in a legitimate way and is entitled to the rights of ownership. 
But these are without prejudice to others or to society in general. Expropriation is 
conditionally permissible. Article 31 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights 2004 gives 
to everyone a guaranteed right to own private property. The reference to a 
guaranteed right presumably is a reference to a right protected by the law and 
capable of enforcement through the judicial system. Article XXIII of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man 1948 is more limited. There is a right to 
own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and helps to 
maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home. Clearly this is an individual 
right and this would be expected in a declaration of rights. But it does not extend to 
objects of ownership beyond what are essential for decent living. Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights 1969 confers the right to use and enjoyment 
of property. But it may lawfully be subordinated to the interests of society. Again 
                                                          
5 For the text of the instruments referred to in the following paragraphs, see 1. Brownlie and G. Goodwill – Gill 
(eds), Basic Documents on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 
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expropriation is conditionally permissible. Article 14 of the African Charter on Human 
and People Rights 1981 assumes rather than creates are right to property. It states 
that the right to property shall be guaranteed. It may be “encroached upon”, only in 
the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in any 
event in accordance with the law.  
Each of these is a relatively succinct statement of a right in relation to 
property. Variously it is a right to property, a right to own property, a right to own 
private property, a right to use and enjoy property. What is property is not defined. 
Where the right is guaranteed, the expectation is that the guarantee is a legal 
guarantee. These statements are thus cast in the form of statements of value rather 
than directly protectable rights. In each case the right is not absolute and may be 
interfered with or taken away in accordance with the law and not otherwise.  
(c) The approach in Europe  
 The most detailed provisions recognising human rights in relation to 
ownership are sourced in Europe. Article 1 of the Protocol to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 
states:  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one should be deprived of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law. 
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a 
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions or penalties.  
There are a number of points to note: 
• The entitlement is conferred upon legal persons as well as natural persons 
• It relates to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
• Deprivation of possessions is permitted conditionally 
• Laws necessary to control the use of property in accordance of the general 
interest are not affected. 
Protection of property is the heading of article 1. The only reference to property in 
article 1 is in the second paragraph in context of controlling the use of property. 
Property for this purpose seems to mean the object of ownership. Controlling the use 
of property is some distance from the protection of property. On the other hand an 
entitlement to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions is more consistent with the 
idea of protection of property. What seems to be contemplated, therefore, is a 
property regime which involves on the one hand entitlements and on the other hand 
restrictions.  
 Article 17 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 2000 
similarly recognises a right coupled with a restriction on the use of the object of 
ownership. But in this case the right or entitlement is more specific than the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions. It is a right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath lawfully 
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acquired possessions. The form, structure and language of these provisions suggest 
that their function within the legal system goes beyond a statement of fundamental 
values and in the direction of protectable rights and enforceable obligations.  
(d) The approach of the European Court  
 The European Court of Human Rights has analysed article 1 of the protocol to 
the 1950 Convention in this way: 
“Article 1 guarantees in substance the right of property. It comprises three 
distinct rules. The first, which is expressed in the first sentence of the first 
paragraph and is of a general nature, lays down the principle of peaceful 
enjoyment of property. The second rule, in the second sentence of the same 
paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain 
conditions. The third, contained in the second paragraph, recognises that the 
Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of 
property in accordance of the general interest, by enforcing such laws as they 
deem necessary for the purpose. However, the rules are not “distinct” in a 
sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with 
particular instances of interference with the peaceful enjoyment of property. 
They must therefore be construed in the light of the general principle laid 
down in the first rule.”6 
The importance of this judicial analysis lies in the first sentence. It refers to the 
substance of the right of property. This is consistent with the heading of article 1: 
protection of property. However, as we have seen, the word “property” does not 
appear in the first sentence of the first paragraph: the word is possessions. The 
entitlement thus relates to possessions rather than to property. However the third 
rule relates to the capacity of the state to legislate to control the use of property. 
Accordingly the capacity for objects of ownership to be controlled arises in relation to 
the expression “use of property”. In this way control is linked to use, while entitlement 
is linked to enjoyment. What the court has created by its analytical approach in this 
case, it is suggested, is a concept close to our description of a property regime. 
Equally important is the reference by the court to the three “rules” and the 
connections between them. Finally, in relation to the last sentence in the comment of 
the court, the first rule is described as a general principle while the second and third 
rules “are concerned with particular instances of interference” with the entitlement in 
the first rule described as a general principle. The language of the court is clearly the 
language of the law and of legal rules.   
 An example of these rules in operation is the decision of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the Chassagnou case.7 According to a French law – the Loi 
Verdeille – power was conferred upon a public agency to transfer compulsorily 
hunting rights over land. It was argued in this case by the owners of the land that 
“the obligation to transfer hunting rights over their land...constituted an abnormal 
deprivation of their right to use their property”.8 The court noted that there had been 
no deprivation in this case of the right to use, lease or sell the land as the object of 
ownership. However “the compulsory transfer of the hunting rights over their 
                                                          
6 Fredin v Sweden (1991) 3 International Environmental Law Reports 166 at p182 
7  Chassagnou v France (1999) 3 International Environmental Law Reports 371.  
8 Ibid at p403  
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land...prevents them from making use of the right to hunt, which is directly linked to 
the right of property, as they see fit.”9 They were, in effect, “obliged to tolerate the 
presence of armed men and gun dogs on their land every year.” 10What was the 
consequence: 
“This restriction on the free exercise of the right of use undoubtedly 
constitutes an interference with the applicants’ enjoyment of their rights as the 
owners of property.”11 
This issue fell to be decided in accordance to the second paragraph of article 
1 – the third rule. The court in this case once again used the word “property” rather 
than the word “possession.” The issue ultimately turned on interference with use as 
an infringement of an entitlement to peaceful enjoyment. This approach-it is 
suggested-is consistent with the notion of property as a property regime that 
comprises a set of interconnected entitlements, restrictions and liabilities. In other 
words a combination of rules of competence and rules of limitation which recognise, 
protect and regulate the public interest as well as the private interests in the object of 
ownership.  
(e) Property as a human right in Australia  
 Human rights in relation to property are part not only of international law but 
also of national legal systems. Human rights in relation to the objects of ownership 
appear frequently in constitutions, bills of rights and other instruments. Their form 
and substance no doubt reflect the culture of the legal environment of which they are 
a part. Let us consider one example: namely the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006 of the state of Victoria in Australia. Section 20 of the 
charter states that a person must not be deprived of his or her property other than in 
accordance with law. Section 32 of the charter requires statutory provisions to be 
interpreted compatibly with human rights in so far as it is possible to do so 
consistently with them. Section 38 of the charter makes it unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way that is incompatible with a human right or, in making a 
decision, to fail to give proper consideration to a relevant human right. It is clear that 
the right stated in section 20 is not absolute. This is simply because it provides for a 
person to be deprived of property in accordance with law. Section 7 (2) states the 
limits within which the law can do so. Namely a human right may be subject under 
law only to such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into 
account all relevant factors including those stated in the section. According to the 
Court of Appeal in Victoria 12a three step process must be undertaken to consider 
whether the statutory provision infringes a charter right. Step 1 is to ascertain the 
meaning of the relevant provision by applying the relevant principles of interpretation. 
Step 2 is to consider in the light of this interpretation whether the relevant provision 
breaches a human right protected by the charter. Step 3 is to apply section 7 (2) of 
the charter to determine whether the limit imposed on the right is justified. It is a 
judicial responsibility to apply the charter in this way. A court or a tribunal has an 
element of discretion in this but it is a discretion carefully circumscribed by these 
                                                          
9 Ibid at p403 
10 Ibid at p403 
11 Ibid at p403 
12 R v Momcilovic (2010) 265 Australian Law Reports 751 at para 35 
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provisions of the charter and by the way in which they have been judicially given 
effect.  
 One case which addressed this question is the case of Smith 13determined by 
the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in 2010. It involved a tension between 
the right in relation to property in section 20 and the right in relation to privacy in 
section 13 (a) of the charter. An owner of land applied for a planning permit to 
undertake external alterations to his house including the construction of a pergola 
and a first floor balcony. A condition was attached to the permit requiring screening 
of the balcony to prevent overlooking of the premises built on adjacent land. The 
issue turned to some extent upon the meaning of the relevant provision of the 
planning scheme which dealt with the issue of overlooking. “Its stated objective is to 
limit views into existing secluded private open space and habitable room windows of 
neighbouring properties. The standard set by the clause to meet this objective is that 
a balcony with a direct view into existing secluded private open space and habitable 
room windows within 9 metres (measured horizontally) should utilise one of a range 
of potential mitigation measures, including screening, obscure glazing, changes to 
sill heights.” 14Screening was a discretionary option to achieve this objective. It may 
accordingly be seen to be in the public interest to protect against overlooking and at 
the same time to be in the interest of land owners not to be overlooked. Section 20 of 
the charter seeks to protect – at least to some extent – the interest of the land owner 
in the context of this property regime. There were accordingly three interests at 
stake: the public interest demonstrated by the planning scheme and the private 
interests of the two subjects of ownership. The objects of ownership-the land and the 
buildings on the land- represent the physical reality of this planning strategy.  
 In the event it was decided that a decision under the planning legislation was 
subject to the charter, that the relevant provisions of the planning scheme were not 
incompatible with the charter and that any decision that properly considered all 
relevant planning considerations would represent a reasonable, proportionate and 
justifiable limitation on the neighbour’s right to privacy and would not be in breach of 
the charter. Although much of the analysis turned on the right to privacy rather than 
the right in relation to property, the following comment was made:  
“It is arguable that the wider property rights of [the land owner seeking the 
planning permit] may be interfered with if he is deprived of the opportunity to 
use and develop his land as he wishes: that is by constructing the balcony 
without a screen to [the adjacent land owner’s] property.”15 
The issue on the merits became how to achieve a balance between the right to 
privacy and the right in relation to property. That was a matter of fact and 
circumstance within the framework of the planning legislation and the charter. The 
case was referred to the tribunal invested with jurisdiction on the merits to make a 
decision on the basis of this analysis of the law.  
Property in natural resources  
(a) Introduction  
                                                          
13 Smith v Hobsons Bay City Council [2010] Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal 668 
14 Ibid at para 16  
15 Ibid at para 8 
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 Most of our discussion so far has concentrated upon land – particularly the 
surface of land-as the object of ownership. Certainly land has historically been at the 
heart of the controversies about the nature and function of property regimes. As we 
have seen, the feudal system essentially created tenure arrangements in relation to 
the holding of interests in land. But the feudal system sat side by side with the 
common law which recognised rights of common in relation to the use of land. These 
rights of common were essentially profits ‘a prendre whose subject matter included 
fish, soil, peat, turf, timber, underwood, sand, gravel, stone and minerals. Many of 
these natural resources have become important economically and politically since 
the middle ages. One of the earliest manifestations of this was the case of Mines 16in 
1568. It needs to be recalled that under the common law ownership of the surface of 
land carried with it ownership of everything above and below the surface. This would 
include soil, vegetation and timber as well as subjacent minerals. Under the feudal 
system all land was held of a superior and ultimately of the Crown. A tenure system 
such as the feudal system enabled the creation of fragmented interests in the land 
including the natural resources associated with its superjacent and subjacent areas.  
(b) Property in gold and silver under the common law  
The precise issue in the case of Mines was ownership of gold and silver. 
Servants of Queen Elizabeth had been dispatched to search for and extract gold and 
silver on lands belonging to the Earl of Northumberland. Gold and silver were found 
and the issue for the Court of Exchequer was whether the gold and silver belonged 
to Queen Elizabeth or the Earl of Northumberland. The decision of the court was 
clear: 
“All mines of gold or silver throughout the realm, or of base metal, wherein 
there is any are of gold or silver of however small value, belong to the King by 
prerogative, with liberty to dig, and lay the same upon the land of the subject, 
and carry it away.”17 
What is interesting is the justification for this decision. Three reasons were presented 
by the Queen’s Attorney to the court and accepted by the court in support of 
ownership by the Crown of all gold and silver within the realm irrespective of who 
owned the surface of the land. These were the reasons:18 
• “the excellency of the thing” – gold and silver were the most excellent 
things and belonged therefore to the person who was most excellent 
• “the necessity of the thing” – the King was the head of the public weal and 
the subjects were its members and it was the duty of the King to preserve 
his subjects which required an army to defend them against hostilities and 
an army could be maintained without treasure 
• “convenience of the subjects in the way of mutual commerce and traffick” 
– the need for coinage in support of trade and commerce.  
One supplementary reason was offered. If access to gold and silver were made 
available to any subject of the Crown, that person might “surpass the King in 
                                                          
16 Case of mines (1568) 75 English Reports 472 
17 Ibid at p477  
18 Ibid at pp479 to 481 
12 
 
treasure and substance.” A subject could not be superior to the King for this could be 
“subversive of all order and rule”. And by way of a conclusion: 
“The law of England...observes a due proportion and symmetry in the 
members of the public weal, and therefore it makes the King possessor of all 
mines of gold and silver in whatever lands they are found within the realm.”19 
This brings together the concepts of ownership and sovereignty – dominium and 
imperium. Gold and silver thus belong to the Crown essentially because it is in the 
public interest that this is the relevant rule of law. It was at that time a rule of 
competence to which no rule of limitation was attached. This has changed 
substantially since then.  
(c) Property in fugacious substances  
 So much for gold and silver. What about other minerals? According to the 
common law, as we have noted, natural resources on or below the surface of the 
land belong to the owner of the surface of the land. This was always subject to the 
creation of fragmented interests. The owner of the surface of the land could always 
grant to someone else the right to explore for and extract minerals. Conversely the 
grant of an interest in land could reserve to the granter any specific interests in 
minerals and other resources.  
Such a property regime seemed to be largely effective until oil became a 
particularly important commodity towards the beginning of the 20th century. 
Fugacious substances like oil and water have the inherent capacity to move in ways 
that are in many respects unpredictable and unknown. A number of common law 
jurisdictions responded by enacting legislation conferring ownership of oil and gas 
upon the Crown or the State. In some cases such a statutory property regime was 
extended to include all minerals and then to include subterranean natural resources 
such as geothermal energy. Even more recently the capacity for the techniques of 
geosequestration and biosequestration to respond to the emission of greenhouse 
gases contributing to climate change has prompted the introduction of statutory 
property regimes enabling the use of these techniques.  
Water, fish and fauna have the propensity to move about almost of their own 
free will. These natural resources have been treated somewhat differently by the 
common law. None of these natural resources in their natural environment is subject 
to ownership. The owner or occupier of the banks of a watercourse has a right of 
access to the water – a riparian right. Similarly the owner of the surface of land has a 
right of access to water contained in subterranean aquifers. Once this right of access 
is exercised, then a property regime or a regime like a property regime applies. The 
right to fish is neither a riparian right or a right associated with the ownership or 
occupation of land. It is under the common law a public right. It is exercisable by any 
member of the public who chooses to exercise it. According to the common law, 
fauna in their natural environment are not subject to ownership until they have been 
taken into possession. But now in most common law jurisdictions water, fish and 
fauna are managed in accordance with statutory regimes. Whether they are statutory 
property regimes is an issue for consideration by analysis of a number of judicial 
decisions. Before considering them, let us consider some examples of statutory 
                                                          
19 Ibid at p481 
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regimes that provide for ownership of natural resources. By way of examples we will 
consider the relevant legislation of the state of Queensland in Australia.  
(d) Statutory property regimes in Queensland in Australia  
The point of commencement is section 40 of the Constitution Act 1867 of 
Queensland. It states: 
The entire management and control of the waste lands belonging to the 
Crown in the said state and also the appropriation of the gross proceeds of 
the sales of such lands and of all other proceeds and revenues of the same 
from whatever source arising within the said state including all royalties, 
mines and minerals shall be vested in the legislature of the state.  
This provision in effect conferred upon the legislature the management and control of 
the un-alienated lands in the state which belonged to the Crown under the rules of 
the common law. Accordingly the creation of an interest in land is now governed by 
legislation rather than as a result of the exercise of powers based upon ownership by 
the Crown. The following points are worthy of note:  
• The provision specifically acknowledges that the waste lands belong to the 
Crown – a recognition of ownership 
• The benefits of ownership include royalties, mines and minerals – these 
are now subject to legislation  
• The legislature is invested with the entire management and control of 
waste lands – an element of a property regime.  
The source of ownership has not changed: waste lands continue to belong to the 
Crown and in this sense the Crown remains the source of title. The Crown thus 
remains the subject of ownership and waste lands remain the object of ownership. 
What has changed is the source of authority to determine the objectives of this 
property regime. These are now determined by the legislature and not by the Crown. 
And the legislature has proceeded to do precisely this. Let us now consider some 
examples of how the legislature has exercised this constitutional power of 
management and control of the waste lands belonging to the Crown – including 
mines and minerals.  
 Mining has been a significant activity in Queensland since the second half of 
the 19th century. First, it was mining for gold; then for coal; and now for oil and gas. 
The legislation about minerals reflects the rules in the constitution. However the 
legislation uses the word “property” as a noun rather than the word “belonging” which 
is used as a verb in the constitution. What has been created, it is suggested, is a 
property regime but reflective of the rules in the constitution. According to section 8 
(1) of the Mineral Resources Act 1989 gold on or below the surface of land is the 
property of the Crown. This does no more than restate the common law position. 
According to the common law coal belongs to the owner of the surface of the land. 
This may be the Crown or a person who has acquired an interest in the land – 
including the coal – from the Crown. Section 8 (2) states that coal is the property of 
the Crown except where the grant of land alienated before 1910 did not contain a 
reservation of coal to the Crown. Accordingly – depending upon the date of 
alienation of the land – coal may be in private ownership or in Crown ownership. 
Section 9 (1) removes the power of a person to authorise mining activities even if the 
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person is the owner of the mineral in question. Consequently any activity in relation 
to minerals requires authorisation in accordance with Mineral Resources Act 1989. A 
person may own coal but cannot engage in or authorise mining activities. This is 
reserved to the Crown and its agencies. The legislation makes it clear that minerals 
are the “property” of the Crown but their management and control are matters for the 
legislature. The agencies of the Crown must comply with the legislation. “Property” in 
this statutory sense is thus part of the overall set of arrangements which therefore 
may be described as a property regime. “Property” in the sense of ownership is a 
part of this regime but so are the rules about the management and control of the 
resource in question.  
 The development of petroleum and gas resources in Queensland is governed 
by the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004. Structurally this act is 
similar to the Mineral Resources Act 1989 which we have just discussed. There are 
two significant differences. Section 26 (2) states that all petroleum is and always has 
been the property of the state. Accordingly, unlike coal, petroleum cannot be in 
private ownership. Section 28 (1) states that if a person produces petroleum, it 
becomes the person’s property if it is produced in accordance with the relevant 
legislation. This probably restates the common law position. In relation to coal, for 
example, a mining lease granted under the common law has been characterised as 
a transfer of ownership of the mineral from the owner of the mineral in its natural 
location underground to the person authorised to extract it. In other words, 
ownership is transferred once the mineral has been extracted. There is no provision 
to this effect in the Mineral Resources Act 1989. However section 28 (1) of the 
Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 creates a similar statutory rule. 
Finally, in the context of a subterranean resources, there is section 11 (1) of the 
Geothermal Exploration Act 2004. It provides that all geothermal energy on or below 
the surface of any land in the state is, and is taken always to have been the property 
of the state. But, as in the case of all minerals, activities in relation to the resource 
are prohibited without authorisation granted under the legislation. It seems clear that, 
although in all of these cases the state has property in the resource, this is no more 
than one element of the complex property regime created by the legislation. While 
the state may be the subject of ownership and the coal, petroleum, gas or 
geothermal energy is the object of the ownership, the outcomes to be achieved in 
managing and controlling the resource are determined in accordance with the 
legislation rather than in the exercise of a discretion sourced in ownership. This is 
consistent with section 40 of the Constitution Act 1867.  
 The objectives stated by the mining legislation and the geothermal energy 
legislation are for the most part directed at the use and development of these 
resources. Environmental factors are part of the statutory management and control 
arrangements. For example, an environmental authority granted under the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 must have been granted before mining activities 
can take place. The Environmental Protection Act 1994 is directed principally at the 
protection of the environment. The Nature Conservation Act 1992, on the other hand, 
is directed solely at the conservation of nature. Nevertheless this act enables the use 
and development of natural and cultural resources in protected areas and in 
circumstances involving protected species. Such activities require authorisation. 
However, it is no surprise that a property regime in the sense that we are discussing 
is part of these statutory arrangements.  
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Section 61 (1) of the Nature Conservation Act 1992 provides that all cultural 
and natural resources of a national park (scientific), national park, national park 
(recovery), conservation park or resources reserve are the property of the state. 
Cultural resources of a protected area include those of value to the Indigenous 
community. In this case there is an exception to ownership by the state. The reason 
is that the provisions of the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act 2003 take precedence to 
the extent that they provide for the ownership of Aboriginal cultural heritage other 
than by the state. Interestingly in this context, the terminology of the legislation has 
switched from property to ownership. 
Flora and fauna are capable of protection under the Nature Conservation Act 
1992 even if they are not located in protected areas – for example outside national 
parks. Once again “property” is an element of these statutory arrangements. 
According to section 83 (1) all protected animals are the property of the state and 
according to section 84 (1) all protected plants (other than protected plants on 
private land) are the property of the state. In both cases “property” passes from the 
state to the person holding the instrument of authorisation to take the animal or the 
plant. However, in accordance with section 87, “the state is not legally liable for an 
act or omission merely because protected animals and plants are the property of the 
state.” In other words ownership does not necessarily carry liability. Interestingly, 
although it is the word “property” which is used in these substantive provisions, the 
heading of the division which incorporates these provisions is “ownership of 
protected wildlife”. Once again this is an example of the use of different terminology 
by the legislature in a context which does not clearly differentiate between the words 
used.  
 Then there are water resources. The normative arrangements for the 
management of water resources have always been something of a challenge for the 
common law. Towards the end of the 19th century it became clear that the rules of 
the common law were not likely to be particularly effective in a continent with 
Australia’s variable climate. Accordingly at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries a 
set of arrangements that may be likened to a public domain regime was introduced. 
The basis of such a regime in Queensland is section 19 of the Water Act 2000. It 
states that all rights to the use, flow and control of all water in Queensland are 
vested in the State. With very limited exceptions, any access to and use of water 
requires authorisation in accordance with the Water Act 2000. Significantly section 
19 does not use the word “property” or “ownership”. The trilogy of use, flow and 
control is tantamount to giving to the state almost total and exclusive powers for the 
management of water resources. Individual water rights are either stated directly in 
the legislation or granted in accordance with the legislation. An example of the 
former is the right of an owner of land adjoining a watercourse to take water from the 
watercourse for stock or domestic purposes. An example of the latter is a water 
allocation, a water licence or a water permit granted in accordance with the 
legislation. The legislation is designed to ensure that a decision to grant one of these 
entitlements achieves the stated objectives of the legislation. These are essentially 
the sustainable use and management of the water resources and their efficient use.  
(e) Conclusion  
 This review of these statutory regimes in Queensland supports the suggestion 
that a property regime is becoming a way of ensuring that environmental governance 
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achieves its objectives. There are entitlements of various kinds. Some exist as a rule 
of law – particularly a rule of competence – while others exist as a result of a grant – 
itself in the form of a rule of competence – of an entitlement. A rule in the form of a 
right of ownership is often the foundation of the system – for example a rule that all 
petroleum is the property of the state. Similarly a right of ownership may be the 
outcome of the system in the sense that ownership of the petroleum is a result of 
exercising the right to mine. Consistently with this, the object of ownership is clearly 
identified – gold, coal, oil, gas, geothermal energy. The subject of ownership is or 
can be clearly identified – the Crown, the state, the holder of the entitlement.  
Most importantly of all in the emerging set of arrangements under discussion, 
all of these are linked in various ways to the achievement of the objectives stated by 
the legislation. In this sense it has become not a system based upon discretion – 
often the traditional view of a set of so called property rights – but a system which 
includes not only these rules of competence but also a complex set of rules of 
limitation which indicate either how decisions are to be made or what objectives are 
to be achieved in making these decisions. This system recognises the existence of 
sets of rights, of a range of common but sometimes competitive interests, and a 
complex set of relationships between these. It is the emerging statement of 
prescribed objectives that is the distinguishing characteristic of this kind of property 
regime. The existence of rights, the identification of their holder and the identification 
of their substance – the traditional indicia of rights of property – are essentially static 
in nature. It is the dynamic aspect introduced into the system by the prescription of 
objectives that takes environmental governance into the 21st century.  
Judicial approaches to property in natural resources  
(a) The sea bed in Scotland 20 
 So far our analysis has been concerned with a number of historical aspects of 
environmental governance, a range of doctrinal approaches to property and a review 
of the text of a number of international, regional and national instruments affecting 
environmental governance. The discussion now turns to a review of the way in which 
the judiciary in a number of cases have approached this elusive concept of property. 
Let us begin with an analysis of a decision based entirely upon the fundamental 
principles supporting a system of law that reflects both the common law and the civil 
law traditions and in this case untrammelled by legislation. It is a decision of the 
Court of Session in Scotland in 1891 about the capacity of the Crown to protect the 
sea bed and its resources. A statutory body was empowered to dredge the river 
Clyde to ensure that navigation was unimpeded. It was decided to deposit the waste 
materials dredged up from the bed of the river in Loch Long – a sea loch linked to 
the river Clyde. The Crown acting through the Lord Advocate applied to the court for 
an order to prevent the deposit of these materials in Loch Long. Two of the doctrines 
in support of the application included these: that ownership of the solum – the bed of 
the loch – was invested in the Crown and that the Crown was entitled to prevent 
interference with its rights of ownership. In the event the court ordered the cessation 
of the deposit of these waste materials into Loch Long. The reasoning of the court 
was quite clear. The use of the property – the bed of the loch – was required to be in 
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the public interest and that it was a matter for the Crown to determine what was the 
public interest. However one of the judges went further:  
“The title of the Crown to the solum of Loch Long is the only title to that solum 
which exists and in respect of that title is in position to resist any attempt to 
invade the rights which the trust title confers. It is the duty of a trustee to 
prevent any unwarranted invasion of the trust subjects.”21 
The reference to “trust title” is critical. The Crown is a trustee and it is a trustee 
acting on behalf of the public interest. Notwithstanding that the public interest is a 
matter for the Crown and not subject to review by the court – at least in 1891 – the 
concept of fiduciary obligations imposed upon the Crown lies at the foundation of this 
decision.  
(b) Sea fisheries in the United States of America 22 
 Some 50 years later the arrangements for regulating commercial shrimp 
fishing in the territorial sea were analysed by the Supreme Court of the United States 
of America. Shrimp boats operating in South Carolina particularly in the territorial sea 
were required to be licensed. The licence fee for South Carolina residents was $25 
but for nonresidents of South Carolina it was $2,500. A group of fishermen who were 
residents in Georgia claimed that this discriminatory treatment violated section 2 of 
article 4 of the Constitution of the United States of America. The court decided that 
the constitution had been violated. The court however made some comments about 
the rationale underlying the imposition of a licence fee. The licence fee was part of a 
set of arrangements designed to regulate commercial shrimp fishing. It was 
suggested to the court that “fish and game are the common property of all citizens of 
the governmental unit and that the government, as a sort of trustee, exercises this 
“ownership” for the benefit of its citizens”. 23Consequently the relevant government 
could exercise its powers of ownership in any way it thought fit – including 
discriminating against persons “lacking any beneficial interest”. 24It was therefore a 
matter entirely for the states unaffected by the provisions of the Constitution of the 
United States of America. The Supreme Court was not impressed by this argument. 
It was not fundamentally a matter of ownership but rather of the legislative capacity 
of the state. In other words it was an issue of imperium rather than dominium. 
According to the chief justice:  
“The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a 
fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a 
state have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important 
resource.”25 
In other words, if a state is the subject of ownership and particular natural 
resources are the object of ownership and if there is relevant legislation regulating 
the natural resource, then any rules in relation to ownership are subservient to any 
rules created by the legislature. In this case, since ownership was irrelevant, the 
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22 Toomer v Witsell (1948) 334 United States Reports 385 
23 Ibid at p399 
24 Ibid at p400 
25 Ibid at p402 
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constitutional guarantee became relevant. It was accordingly concluded in this 
respect:  
“There is no necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration [the 
preservation and regulation of the exploitation of an important resource] and 
the constitutional command that the state exercise that power, like its other 
powers, so as not to discriminate without reason against citizens of other 
states.”26 
The fundamental hierarchy of relevant principles emerged in this order:  
• The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the United States of America 
• The relevant provisions of the state legislation 
• Ownership within the traditional meaning of the common law. 
(c) Sea fisheries in Australia 27 
The regulation of fisheries resources emerged as an issue for the High Court 
of Australia in 1989. The Sea Fisheries Regulations 1962 of the state of Tasmania in 
Australia prohibited the taking of abalone without a licence. The fee payable for the 
licence depended upon the quantity of abalone authorised to be taken. If the fee was 
characterised as a tax and a duty of excise, then it was beyond the powers of the 
state of Tasmania and an infringement of section 90 of the Constitution of the 
Commonwealth which gives to the Parliament of the Commonwealth the power to 
impose duties of customs and of excise. The court decided that the sum payable 
was not a duty of exercise and therefore validly imposed by the state of Tasmania. 
What is particularly important are the reasons supporting this characterisation of the 
sum payable.  
 Under the common law fish in their natural environment do not belong to 
anyone and any member of the public is entitled to fish in tidal waters. Once the fish 
have been caught and taken into possession, then these fish become the objects of 
ownership by the subject of ownership who exercise this right. In most jurisdictions 
this has been changed by legislation. Fishing – especially commercial fishing – is 
prohibited without some form of authorisation such as a licence. What, then, is the 
nature of this licensing regime particularly in the context of a potential property 
regime? Three of the justices of the High Court explained the reason underlying the 
licensing system in this way:  
“The licensing system...is not a mere device for tax collecting. Its basis lies in 
environmental and conservational considerations which require that 
exploitation, particularly commercial exploitation, of limited public natural 
resources be carefully monitored and legislatively curtailed if their existence is 
to be preserved.”28 
The justices went on to explain the nature of the interests created by the licence. In 
their words:  
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27 Harper v Minister of Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 commonwealth Law Reports 314 
28 Ibid at p325 
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“The right of commercial exploitation of a public resource for person profit has 
become a privilege confined to those who hold commercial licences. This 
privilege can be compared to a profit ‘a prendre. In truth, however, it is an 
entitlement of a new kind created as part of a system for preserving a limited 
natural public resource in a society which is coming to recognise that, in so far 
as such resources are concerned, to fail to protect may destroy and to 
preserve the right of everyone to take what he or she will may eventually 
deprive that right of all content.”29 
Accordingly the payment for the licence is “the quid pro quo for the property which 
may lawfully be taken pursuant to the statutory right or privilege which a commercial 
licence confers upon its holder. It is not a tax.”30 
What is interesting about these comments is their reference to “property” in 
the context of this statutory system of regulation. Where does this “property” come 
from? One of the justices, consistently with the majority, explained that the licence 
conferred a privilege “analogous to a profit 'a prendre in or over the property of 
another.” However His Honour went on to explain the source of this “property” in 
these words: 
“A limited natural resource which is otherwise available for exploitation by the 
public can be truly said to be public property whether or not the Crown has the 
radical or freehold title to the resource.”31 
It will be recalled that the rules of the common law were based upon the absence of 
a property regime in relation to fish. The legislation in relation to fishing – certainly in 
most of the states in Australia – is silent on the issue of property. Nevertheless what 
emerges from this statement of doctrine is the existence of “a public property” regime 
in relation to resources liable to overexploitation. This is particularly so “whether or 
not the Crown has the radical or freehold title to the resource.” By way of comparison 
with land – where the Crown has the radical or freehold title to the resource – there 
is no radical or freehold title to fish as a resource. In this sense this statement of the 
doctrine underlying this regime represents a significant new dimension to the 
elements of a property regime in the context of its statutory framework.  
(d) Fauna in Australia  
 The rules of the common law in relation to fauna are similar in many respects 
to those relating to fishery resources. In other words, fauna in their natural 
environment do not belong to anyone but if they are taken into possession by 
someone who has a right of access to them – for example, the owner of the surface 
of the land which is their habitat – acquires ownership by appropriation. It will be 
recalled that the Nature Conservation Act 1992 of the state of Queensland in 
Australia stated that all cultural and natural resources in a number of protected areas 
such as a national park are the property of the state and that protected wildlife and 
plants are the property of the state. This legislation replaced the Fauna Conservation 
Act 1974. Section 54 (1) (a) of the 1974 Act prohibited the taking or keeping of fauna 
without a licence or other a form of authorisation. Section 7 (1) stated that “all fauna, 
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save fauna taken or kept during an open season with respect to that fauna, is the 
property of the Crown”.  
The issue before the High Court of Australia 32arose in the context of criminal 
responsibility particularly in relation to of an offence about property. One of the 
issues was the relationship between the licensing system and the conferment of 
property on the Crown. One of the justices explained the common law in these 
terms: 
“The right to catch and kill is not a right of property in wild animals but an 
incident of the ownership of the soil. Nor are wild animals in the enjoyment of 
their natural liberty capable of being stolen.”33 
After discussing the role of the criminal law in relation to property, His Honour turned 
to the consequences of the conferment of property on the Crown by section 7. 
According to His Honour: 
“Does the existence of s.7 turn an offence created by s.54 into an offence 
relating to property? I think not. If an infringement of the Crown’s rights in 
protected fauna is not an element of the offence created by s.54, the vesting 
of such rights in the Crown does not add the qualifying element to the offence. 
Section 54 has the same meaning and effect whether or not regard is had to 
s.7: it is a provision calculated not to protect the Crown’s or any other 
person’s rights over or in respect of fauna but to protect fauna from 
destruction or control.”34 
 These statutory arrangements were designed, therefore, to protect fauna from 
destruction. They were not designed to protect the interests of the Crown or of 
anyone else – be they associated with ownership or otherwise. Some of the justices 
considered why section 7 conferred property in fauna on the state. There was no 
single answer to this question. One of the justices expressed a view that section 7 
(1) provides the basis for the royalty system which the legislation established. 
Whatever the reason for the conferment of property in fauna on the Crown, it did not 
detract from the ultimate objective which was to protect fauna. In other words the 
property regime created by the legislation was merely an incidental element of the 
overall statutory system for protecting fauna.  
 In 1999 the High Court 35again addressed section 7 (1) of the Fauna 
Conservation Act 1974. But by 1999 existence of common law native title had been 
recognised in Australia and the Parliament of the Commonwealth had enacted the 
Native Title Act 1993. One of the issues was whether the conferment of a right of 
property in fauna upon the Crown by section 7 extinguished the native title rights or 
interests protected under the native title legislation of the Commonwealth. In 
essence, then, what function did the conferment of property on the Crown perform in 
the context of the legislation at large? This was the answer:  
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35 Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 Commonwealth Law Reports 351 
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“The “property” which the Fauna Act and its predecessors vested in the 
Crown was therefore no more than the aggregate of the various rights of 
control by the executive that the legislation created. So far is now relevant 
those were rights to limit what fauna might be taken and how it might be 
taken, rights to possession of fauna that had been reduced to possession, 
and rights to receive royalty in respect of fauna that was taken (all coupled 
with, or supported by, a prohibition against taking or keeping fauna except in 
accordance with the Act). Those rights are less than the rights of full 
beneficial, or absolute, ownership. Taken as a whole the effect of the Fauna 
Act was to establish a regime forbidding the taking or keeping of fauna expect 
pursuant to a licence granted or by under the Act.”36 
This is entirely consistent with earlier judicial perceptions of the function of 
property in statutory arrangements designed to conserve a resource or protect 
elements of the natural environment. Property performs a number of functions but it 
is no more than one instrument designed to support the achievement of the 
objectives stated by the legislation. A property regime, in other words, supports the 
objectives of the regime but it cannot justify departure in any way from them. Once 
again, property is a rule of competence but powers conferred by it are subject and 
subject always to the rules of limitation imposed upon the private sector and the 
public sector by the legislation.  
(e) Water resources in Australia 37 
 Let us direct our attention now to how the High Court of Australia has 
addressed issues of property in relation to water. Section 51 (xxxi) of the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth enables the Parliament of the Commonwealth to make laws 
with the respect to the acquisition of property on just terms from any state or person 
for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws. What is 
property and whether it has been acquired are difficult issues. In one case 
Commonwealth funds had been made available to the state of New South Wales to 
bring about a reduction of water available for irrigation. The reduction of water was 
achieved by varying the relevant water plans in accordance with the legislation of 
New South Wales. The effect of varying the water plans was to reduce the amount of 
water available to be extracted. It was claimed that this constituted an acquisition of 
property otherwise than on just terms. In relation to the issue of property, two issues 
arose for determination by the high court. The first was whether water – in this case 
groundwater – in its natural location was property and the second was whether the 
licences enabling the extraction of the groundwater were property.  
 In relation to the first issue three of the justices made this comment in relation 
to the principles underlying the doctrines of the common law: 
“First and foremost there was then, and still must be, a clear recognition of the 
difficulty of applying notions of ownership or property to water in the ground or 
in a flowing stream. What exactly would be the subject of property rights? 
While still allowed to flow, no part of the water that flows in the stream can be 
isolated and tagged as the water “owned” by some person. And water in the 
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ground may move more slowly but there is no less difficulty in identifying what 
would be the subject of the proprietary rights.” 38 
In other words, to adopt our terminology, there is considerable difficulty in identifying 
who is the subject of ownership and what is the object of ownership. These justices 
then identified the second issue: 
“Next, even if these difficulties of identifying the object in respect of which 
proprietary rights were to exist could be overcome, should any private 
proprietary right be recognised?”39 
There are two points to note in relation to this: 
• The reference to a private right in relation to property acknowledging by 
implication the existence of public proprietary rights 
• The use of the word “should” indicates that this is not about what is the 
applicable rule of law but what the rule of law should be.  
We need to recall that at the end of the 19th century the legal arrangements affecting 
water resources in Australia evolved into what we have described into something of 
the nature of a public domain regime. That is the conferment of all rights in relation to 
water on the state. This was a critical element in the response of the justices to this 
question: 
“Finally, it is of the very first importance to recognise that the common law 
principles established in the 19th century were directed to the adjustment of 
rights between landowners. The issue in this case arises, not because there 
has been some adjustment of those rights, but because the polity has sought 
to regulate generally the access allowed to a common resource.”40 
The fundamental principles underlying the common law recognised water as a 
common resource. So did the legislation introduced at the end of the 19th century. 
Indeed the language of the legislation enacted towards the end of the 19th century 
was language “consonant with a recognition that water is a common resource”.41 
Accordingly neither under the common law nor under the legislation is there 
ownership of water in its natural location.  
 But what was claimed to have been acquired in this case was not water but 
water entitlements. Were they characterised as property for the purposes of the 
constitutional guarantee? Three justices decided that it was not necessary to 
determine this issue. Three justices accepted that the licences were a species of 
property and one justice rejected the contention that they were not property. Much, 
depended, upon whether there had been an acquisition. The majority decided that 
there had been no acquisition. The reason was quite simple. The state – probably 
under the common law but certainly under the legislation – had always had the right 
to manage water as it saw fit but subject only to the legislation. Accordingly nothing 
had been gained as a result of what had happened in this case from the perspective 
of the state. Nothing, in other words, had been acquired which had not been 
                                                          
38 Ibid at para 112 
39 Ibid at para 113 
40 Ibid at para 115 
41 Ibid at para 73 
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available to the state prior to the claimed acquisition. As three of the justices 
explained:  
“The ground water...was not the subject of private rights enjoyed by [the 
licensees]. Rather...it was a natural resource, and the state always had the 
power to limit the volume of water to be taken from that resource. The state 
exercised that power from time to time by legislation imposing a prohibition 
upon access to and use of that natural resource, which might be lifted or 
qualified by compliance with a licensing system. The changes of which the 
[licensees] complain implemented the policy of the state respecting the use of 
a limited natural resource, but that did not constitute an “acquisition” by the 
state in the sense of s.51 (xxxi).”42 
Water resources are accordingly common resources in the sense that they do 
not belong to anyone in particular – either an individual within the private sector or an 
institution within the public sector. The normative arrangements for managing water 
resources are a complex structure of rules of competence and rules of limitation. 
Some examples of the former are rights of access, of use and of control and 
examples of the latter are the permissible purposes for the exercise of these rights 
and the stated objectives to be achieved by granting these rights. There is no 
positive function for property to perform. To the extent that water resources are 
common resources, property performs a negative function in depriving those 
claiming ownership of ownership. Notwithstanding these suggestions, the extent to 
which a property regime is an element of water resources governance remains a 
controversial issue. In any event, the governance of water resources is moving 
inexorably in the direction of what is determined to be in the public interest. The 
reason is simply because the “polity has sought to regulate generally the access 
allowed to a common resource”. The polity in this sense comprises the legislature, 
the executive and the judiciary acting together in accordance with their discrete 
functions within the overall system. The function of the judiciary is to ensure that the 
legislature and the executive comply with the normative framework within which they 
operate. Ultimately it is the form, the structure and the language of the relevant 
instruments that determine the details of these arrangements. 
Conclusion  
Although we have concentrated upon the concept of property in the context of 
the law, there is little doubt that it means different things in different contexts and 
from different disciplinary perspectives. Even within the law the function of property 
remains controversial. Traditionally property was characterised as a set of static 
relationships between the owner and the thing owned. The rules did no more than 
identify who owned what. The answer to the dynamic question what can be done 
with the thing owned was probably a reflection of who owned it. In other words the 
objectives to be achieved in using the thing owned probably lay very much in the 
discretion of the owner. If the owner was the Crown or a similar public institution, the 
objective was likely to be what the owner determined was in the public interest – in 
some respects a political decision. If the owner was an individual person, then the 
objective to be achieved would be the objective perceived to be in the individual’s 
interest.  
                                                          
42 Ibid at para 84 
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There always have been limits to this discretionary approach. Both the civil 
law and the common law recognised there was a mutuality of interest on the part of 
individuals in exercising their rights of ownership. Hence the impact of the use by 
one individual of the thing owned could impact upon the use by another person of 
the thing owned by the other person. The law placed limits upon the manner in which 
these outcomes could be achieved, through for example, the rules about nuisance. 
There emerged the idea of ownership as a rule of competence but increasingly 
impacted upon by rules of limitation restricting the way in which these rules of 
competence were able to be exercised.  
Over recent years an additional dimension has emerged within the legal 
system. What outcomes does the public interest require? This may well have been 
the function of a public institution in the exercise of its inherent executive power or in 
the exercise of its powers sourced in ownership. But the emergence of sustainable 
development as the principle according to which natural resources and the 
environment should be managed has dramatically changed this approach. The 
principle of sustainable development brings together the economic, the social and 
the environmental or ecological perspectives of managing natural resources and the 
environment. It is fundamentally based upon a general conception of what is in the 
public interest but also upon an even broader conception of what is in the interests of 
the global community. The achievement of sustainable development will almost 
certainly impact upon the interests of individual persons and institutions within the 
private sector and more importantly upon how these private sector persons and 
institutions exercise their rights of ownership. Tensions between the exercise of 
rights of ownership and the achievement of sustainable development are likely to 
emerge. The reason is simple. Sustainable development is – in theory at least – 
achieved through the implementation of a wide range of instruments that provide for 
the planning of natural resources, the protection of the environment and for the 
conservation of nature in the long – term interests of the global community.  
The principle of sustainable development is rapidly developing as a rule of 
law. It is increasingly being incorporated within the fabric of legislation. So these 
tensions are part of the legal system. Can the law provide for their resolution? On the 
one hand there is the idea of property as a fundamental human right and on the 
other hand there is the need for natural resources and the environment to be 
managed on a long-term basis in a sustainable fashion. The catalyst for this has in 
some respects been international law through the recognition in various ways of a 
right to property as a human right and the recognition by international law of 
sustainable development as the objective of these environmental governance 
arrangements. We have accordingly considered a range of international instruments 
designed to recognise and protect a right to property as a human and a range of 
national instruments designed to ensure that natural resources are managed 
sustainably for the future. Protection of the environment and the conservation of 
nature are essential elements of this. We have noted that arrangements for planning 
the best use of natural resources, for protecting the environment and for conserving 
nature impact upon the exercise of rights of ownership. What is particularly important 
is that these restrictive arrangements – rules of limitation – are now prescribed 
directly by legislation. They are effectively rules of law and capable of enforcement 
as such. Property or ownership remains a critical element of these arrangements as 
a rule of competence. But property or ownership is only a part of this wider property 
regime. The focus of this regime is the rapidly increasing number of rules of 
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limitation. Thus property is as much an instrument of regulation as it is one of 
authorisation.  
